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Abstract—A significant challenge in modern computer security
is the growing skill gap as intruder capabilities increase, making
it necessary to begin automating elements of penetration testing
so analysts can contend with the growing number of cyber
threats. In this paper, we attempt to assist human analysts by
automating a single host penetration attack. To do so, a smart
agent performs different attack sequences to find vulnerabilities
in a target system. As it does so, it accumulates knowledge,
learns new attack sequences and improves its own internal
penetration testing logic. As a result, this agent (AgentPen for
simplicity) is able to successfully penetrate hosts it has never
interacted with before. A computer security administrator using
this tool would receive a comprehensive, automated sequence
of actions leading to a security breach, highlighting potential
vulnerabilities, and reducing the amount of menial tasks a
typical penetration tester would need to execute. To achieve
autonomy, we apply an unsupervised machine learning algorithm,
Q-learning, with an approximator that incorporates a deep neural
network architecture. The security audit itself is modelled as a
Markov Decision Process in order to test a number of decision-
making strategies and compare their convergence to optimality.
A series of experimental results is presented to show how this
approach can be effectively used to automate penetration testing
using a scalable, i.e. not exhaustive, and adaptive approach.
Index Terms—Pentesting, audit, Q-learning, reinforcement
learning, deep neural network
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer security auditing is a decision-making process
where a computer system is comprehensively explored and
tested, in a secure environment, to reveal potential vulnera-
bilities. Strategically exploring a target system, as an attacker
would, to discover and fix vulnerabilities is currently done
by cyber-security specialists. While often resulting in high
accuracy, human-based decision making is a limited resource
in today’s world, due to skill shortages and rising threats [1].
Therefore, developing an intelligent automated audit process
to complement human resources would be an useful aid going
forwards. However, most existing penetration testing tools (i.e.
pentesting) rely on predefined datasets of exploits and trigger
vulnerabilities one-by-one. The drawback of this is that, in
practice, strategic human decisions are needed at each exploit
“link” in an attack chain, consuming considerable resources.
Conversely, existing automated attack tools struggle to adapt
to environmental changes or update an attack strategy mid-test.
Related works are discussed further in Section I-A.
This paper presents a novel, adaptive approach to pentesting,
using an automated, learning-based, decision-making process.
The tool, AgentPen, removes the human element from the
actual penetration attack stage and discovers its own strategy,
adapting and improving its attack logic in real-time. This
mitigates human limitations, such as speed and scalability.
That said, this approach does not completely remove the need
for cyber-security expertise, but instead raises human analysts
to a higher level of control. Human-based decisions will still
drive (1) the audit with high-level learning algorithm modifi-
cations, (2) hacking ethics, legal concerns, and results, and (3)
develop machine learning strategies and solutions to increase
the performance. AgentPen can be tuned by analysts, given
specific tasks and goals, relieving cyber-security experts from
the more menial, routine, pentesting tasks and enabling them
to focus on higher-level control tasks.
To achieve a sophisticated level of automation, AgentPen
applies a model-free reinforcement machine learning algo-
rithm. Unlike most other methods, this pentesting does not use
a full predefined model of the environment and, instead, learns
the environment using Q-learning [2]. To better generalize the
solution, the original Q-learning algorithm was modified by
integrating an approximator to improve its performance while
maintaining accuracy. This approach has shown that it can
mitigate all the disadvantages of pre-defined environmental
models and also address our research problems (Section I-B).
A. Related Work and Background
Most computer security audit software tools are limited
by human resources, target environment changes, or both,
making many state-of-the-art audit processes time consuming
and/or error-prone. This is particularly troubling with growing
skill-shortages in cyber-security [3], threat increases [4], and
increasing number of computing systems [1]. Auditing relies
on the use of software exploits, pieces of computer code
that trigger a system vulnerability, and additional actions (i.e.,
payloads) may follow after a successful penetration. Nessus
[5] executes Network Vulnerability Tests one by one, using
a list of targets, without examining real-time environmental
changes. Nessus does not automate any decision-making and
is not able to operate independently. Core Impact [6] is
allegedly the most advanced vulnerability scanner on the
market and builds automated attack plans to be executed by
an auditor. The limits of this strategy is that the attack plan
is built on a target environment model prior to penetration
testing, making the tool highly dependent on the model’s
quality and unable to adapt mid-attack. For example, while
building its model and generating an attack plan, Core Impact
assumes that the network configuration is static and in order
to deal with network/host configuration changes, it would
need to recreate the environment model and recalculate the
whole attack plan, increasing cost. This tool has a few other
drawbacks, internal model parameters compromise scalability
and it does not have enough data for new OS versions or
network configurations, reducing likelihood an optimal attack
plan is used. Another popular penetration testing tool that lacks
intelligent automation is Rapid 7 Nexpose [7]. This scanner
supports the entire vulnerability management life-cycle by
using Metasploit [8], a vulnerability exploitation penetration
tool. While this can distribute multiple scan engines across the
network for flexibility, Nexpose cannot learn attack strategies
itself. In summary, the majority of well-known commercial
vulnerability scanners have shown many benefits, but are
highly dependent on the expertise and decisions of security
specialists. These tools have also exhibited adaptability issues,
unable to update an attack strategy if the environment changes.
Within academic literature, security audit scope studies have
proposed improvements to the accuracy, speed and state-space
reduction of penetration testing processes [9]–[12]. However,
these rely heavily on the initial modelling stage and demand
significant security expert involvement. Machine learning tech-
niques have mainly been used in Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) to improve detection, classify threats, and extract
features [13]–[16] rather than automating audits per se. Other
approaches like model checking [17], [18] identify vulnerabili-
ties by comparing several models over a large space. However,
this large space approach is inherently exhaustive, difficult
to scale [19], [20], and not adaptive to target environment
changes. Another non-security paper [21] used model-free
machine learning for agile, self-adaptive congestion manage-
ment in networks. The reinforcement learning (RL) model-
based penetration testing approach is described in [22]. The
hybrid POMDP solving algorithm is demonstrated, which is
heavily dependant on the initial modeling stage and human
expertise. Contrary, authors of [23] attempted to apply model-
free RL for similar purposes. However, the hypothesis was
tested in a simulated environment instead of real infrastructure
and the attacker assumed to know full network topology prior
to the test. The state space model has to be rebuild every
time the topology changes. As a result, the proposed solution
cannot cope with states space expansion and adapt to the live
environment.
This paper uses machine learning techniques such as rein-
forcement learning (RL), Q-learning in particular, and neural
networks. In RL, an agent learns by interacting with the
environment, executing actions at a given state, observing the
immediate outcome, i.e. reward signal, and making subsequent
predictions about the future value of their choices (i.e. Q-value
of a state-action pair) [24]. Q-learning [25] has been proven
to converge to an optimal solution in tabular cases [2] and
adjustments based on experience are executed independently
of the policy followed. In tabular cases, Q-values are stored in
a table for every Markov Decision Process (MDP) state-action
pair. Problems can arise when a large state space makes the
corresponding table intractable. Past studies have overcome
this with an approximator, [26]–[28]. To account for state-
action space limitations in tabular cases, our approach uses
a neural network-based approximator to give our tool both
adaptive and scalable capabilities, which is novel compared to
the state-of-the-art approaches.
Neural networks are universal approximators implemented
as layers of connected neurons that transmit signals to each
other and are modelled by their architecture [29]. To ap-
proximate the state-action space in sequential tasks (e.g., a
series of exploits in an attack sequence) AgentPen uses
a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), specifically, the Elman
Neural Network. RNNs typically have three layers (input,
hidden and output) which are connected in a feed-forward
manner with additional connections between hidden and input
layers to feed hidden neuron values back to the input. This
structure means previously experienced values to future inputs
can be incorporated, so AgentPen can learn a sequence
of actions, “memorizing” previously experienced states [30]–
[32]. The Elman neural network, in particular, is able to
provide the state-space representation for dynamic systems.
The main advantage of Elman neural network is much larger
performance compared to static networks. It allows processing
of time-dependent patterns, which are part of our domain
problem. Therefore, Elman neural networks are applied for
the time series prediction. For the reasons named above, we
choose to use the Elman type RNN in our project [33], [34].
B. Problem Statement
To effectively pentest systems in the current threat land-
scape [4], more automation needs to be introduced. However,
accuracy and performance are the two challenges that must be
addressed. To mirror realistic threats for quality, we consider
both local, on the target, and remote, within the same network,
exploits targeting Windows and Linux systems. Part of both
quality and quantity problems is selecting which machine
learning methods would best automate AgentPen. As the
target system is assumed unknown in our approach, we con-
sider the learning algorithm to be model-free. This deviates
from previous approaches with pre-defined models while still
addressing the problem of attack-sequence quality.
While building an approximator to address the challenge of
quantity, i.e. scalable performance overhead, it was crucial to
choose the best features to describe the state-action space for
the problem at hand. More specifically, performance problems
with the proposed approach to automate pentesting audits
are (1) how to decrease number of features representing the
state space and (2) how to approximate state-action space
with a small feature set. To achieve this, we use an Elman-
type recurrent neural network (RNN) - see Section II-E. Too
many features would place a significant load on the learning
algorithm and may add unacceptable time overheads during
the attack stages. To address this problem, we compress
the feature set into a smaller space using an autoencoder,
Fig. 1. Automatic learning pentesting audit process
just prior to learning. This approach compresses the neural
network input to a smaller, hidden layer with minimal error.
In our experiments this reduced feature set helped address the
performance challenge without negatively affecting the quality
of pentesting achieved.
II. METHODOLOGY
In most current pentesting approaches, a human auditor
is needed to launch exploits and perform different attacks,
using a set of tools. In contrast, this paper proposes trans-
ferring the menial pentesting tasks to the intelligent auto-
mated AgentPen. This section is dedicated to describing our
methodology to the noted challenges of achieving this.
A. Architecture of the Audit System
AgentPen consists of a client (target) and server (host)
(see Figure 1). The server performs multi-step attacks without
human guidance by generating and executing a sequence of
actions one-by-one in a chain. Actions include exploits and
discoveries, such as port scan. AgentPen executes multiple
attacks sequentially. Every time the server attacks a target,
the client is notified of the attack. It then checks whether the
exploit was successful and sends the results back to the server.
It also restarts local services if needed.
The target host in this paper is Windows 7 with a number
of potentially vulnerable ports and services (see Tables I-
II). It is important to note that AgentPen can use any set
of exploits and work with OSs besides Windows. For the
purpose of producing useful experimental results in Section
III, Win7 was used because it is outdated and vulnerable,
testing AgentPen’s ability to learn an optimal attack strategy,
not just a valid one. Although targets and environments may
change (e.g., target updates to Win10), the techniques pre-
sented are able to adapt by using a set of viable exploits during
its learning penetration process. Exploits used by AgentPen
are customized for the environment, derived from Metasploit
and other external sources. For Win7, remote code execution
and local privileges buffer overflow exploits were used. Exploit
payloads were also used to trigger uniquely-named processes
within targets, and once AgentPen successfully penetrates
one target, it automatically moves on to pentest its next
target in a network consisting of more than 80 hosts (Virtual
Machines 8GB RAM + 3GHz CPU).
All decisions on exploits sequences, and the generation
of custom strings for attacks, are done using server-side
Q-learning, while the client generates reward signals. The
environmental feedback provided by the client is fed back
TABLE I
AUDIT MDP STATES.
Audit MDP state Description
Init Initial audit state
Win The host has a Windows OS
Lx The host has a Linux OS
P445 The host has an open port 445
P135 The host has an open port 135
P22 The host has an open port 22
P2525 The host has an open port 2525
Serv1 The host has a vulnerable RDPService
Serv2 The host has a vulnerable MsvcrtService
Serv SSH The host has a SSHService
Expl1 Remote Exploit1 is executed
Expl2 Remote Exploit2 is executed
Expl3 Local Exploit3 is executed
SSH brf SSH brute force attack is performed
Expl12 Remote Exploit1 executed as 2nd exploit
Expl22 Remote Exploit2 executed as 2nd exploit
Expl32 Local Exploit3 executed as 2nd exploit
Fail Final(terminal) state, dead end, i.e. exploit failed
Succ Final(terminal) state, target host hacked
TABLE II
AUDIT MDP ACTIONS.
Audit MDP action Description
Win check Checks for Windows OS
Linux check Checks for Linux OS
Port445 check Checks if Port445 is open
Port135 check Checks if Port135 is open
Port22 check Checks if Port22 is open
Port2525 check Checks if Port2525 is open
Service1 check Check Service1 process is running
Service2 check Check Service2 process is running
SSH check Check SSH process is running
Execute exploit1 Grants remote attacker admin privileges
Execute exploit2 Grants remote attacker user-level privileges
Execute exploit3 local Exploit local services, privilege escalation
Execute SSH brf SSH brute force attack
into the server Q-learning algorithm, indicating if the exploit
successfully breached the target. This updates the reward
signal (see Section II-C) according to the server’s actions.
This client-server architecture is designed to prevent malicious
uses of AgentPen as they should have admin rights on
the target to make the server-client system work. Therefore
only an authorized owner of the target should be able to run
autonomous penetration audits.
B. AgentPen Audit Process
Our audit process is modelled as an MDP, with states
definition resulting from executing specific actions in a given
state and a corresponding reward function to quantify executed
action rewards. These audit states and actions can be found in
Tables I and II. An example of transitions is shown in Figure
2, where Init is the initial system state. AgentPen moves
between states by executing exploits and discovery actions that
reveal the target environment (Table I, 2-10) including running
services. Discovery actions help reduce the action space and,
therefore, performance overhead. If it were discovered that the
target’s OS is Windows, Linux-related exploits would not be
used.
Fig. 2. Examples of MDP audit system transitions from initial state.
In our experiments, targets were left intentionally vulnerable
for remotely executed Exploit1, which grants admin privi-
leges to the attacker, and Exploit2, which grants user-level
privileges. Any privilege changes or successful remote/local
code executions is monitored by the feedback agent. Vulnera-
bilities in local services are exploited locally using Exploit3
to escalate attacker privileges to admin. RDP service is re-
sponsible for remote connections and Msvrcrt service supports
executions of basic C functions from Microsoft C Runtime
Library. If exploits required unique strings, AgentPen auto-
matically generates these with RL.
C. Reward Function
A reward function guides learning by allocating a numerical
signal to the agent actions in given state. While the reinforced
learning algorithm and approximator elements will be defined
in the next subsection, here we define the reward function.
This is the key for finding an optimal attack sequence as the
agent maximizes its cumulative reward via trial and error. The
reward function used (see Eq 1) is defined as a linear combi-
nation of the main reward and additional rewards, defined in
the bullets below.
Reward = Rmain +R1 +R2 +R3 (1)
Here Rmain is defined as a value for reaching a successful
terminal state. The additional reward components are defined
as follows:
• R1: exploit effectiveness according to the metasploit
rating [35]. The more effective, the higher the reward;
• R2: possible OS/service harm if exploit used, according
to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database
[36]. If system service crashes, the reward is smaller;
• R3: additional testing actions (e.g. port scan), defined as
20/n where n is the number of iterations per episode and
20 was obtained experimentally. R3 motivates an agent
to apply environment checks before actual attacks.
High reward values signify better attack choices in order
to reach the successful terminal state (19 in Table I). In our
approximated Q-learning experiments, the reward values are
mapped to the range [0,1] as those are the min and max values
for neural network neurons. These reward values are designed
to provide a fast, technically valid, penetration attack strategy.
D. Q-Learning
This model-free approach is autonomous and does not
require previous knowledge on the target environment; it uses
reinforcement learning instead, Q-learning in particular, to
Algorithm 1: Q-Learning Algorithm
1 Initialize Q(state, action);
2 Observe current state;
3 for every time step do
4 Select action from state;
5 if state trigger successful then
6 take action;
7 check next state′ and reward;
8 update Q-values (see Eq 2);
9 else
10 end action;
11 end
12 state← states′
13 end
identify new system vulnerabilities through the execution of at-
tack sequences. At each time step in the sequence, AgentPen
chooses an action randomly according to a softmax distribu-
tion (i.e., following a softmax policy), which incorporates the
knowledge about previously experienced states. As a result,
the actions leading to higher reward states will be chosen
more often. At the end of an attack sequence the audit agent
receives a numerical signal from either the client or target
agent indicating if it was successful in penetrating the host.
With this information the agent updates its estimations (i.e.,
Q-values for each state-action pair), about the long-term value
of executing the attack, for which the audit agent receives
the immediate reward, and what AgentPen believes it would
receive in subsequent attacks. This Q-learning algorithm can
be succinctly described with the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1
where update “Q-values” is achieved with Eq 2.
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a) + α([r + γmaxQ(s′, a′)]−Q(s, a)) (2)
Here s and s′ define current and next states respectively.
a and a′ stand for current and future actions. r represents a
Reward defined in Eq. 1. Since AgentPen does not know
the underlying MDP model, its initial Q-value estimations
are initialized to zero, as it is ignorant and inexperienced.
This only occurs at the start of an audit, Step 1 of learning
Algorithm 1. In Step 2 the agent observers and checks which
audit state it is in and which actions it is allowed to execute. It
then executes one of the actions following the softmax policy.
After executing an action successfully the agent moves to
another state and receives a reward, as shown by Step 7 inside
if-statement. By interacting with the target environment, the
agent updates its Q-value estimations, at Step 8, using Eq. 2.
This defines the learning rule, which is used to find the new
Q-value based on the old value plus the estimation (prediction)
error multiplied by a learning rate α, a value between 0 and 1.
This dictates how quickly the error is updated, modulating the
learning process. The error itself is the difference between
the old estimation and the result of adding the immediate
reward the agent receives after executing the action and what
it estimates will be the best option in the future, discounted by
a γ parameter, which also ranges from 0 to 1, and represents
how confident the agent is about its future predictions. The
Fig. 3. Deep architecture structure.
agent follows this process until a terminal state is reached and
this entire process, starting from Init, is considered as one
learning episode or epoch, and this is repeated until the agent
converges to an optimal penetration strategy, i.e. an attack
sequence which best maximizes cumulative rewards.
E. Deep Architecture Approximator
As the state space increases, the standard tabular approach
does not scale well. An approximator combined with autoen-
coder can mitigate this problem by reducing the state space
and learning the Q-function itself, instead of Q-values one
at a time. To improve audit performances this paper uses an
Elman-type RNN for approximation.
Elman networks, a three-layer version of RNN (Figure 3),
includes a critical “context unit” that feeds the values from
previous processing steps back to the hidden layer neurons,
merging them with current input values, providing a type of
“memory”. This gives AgentPen the ability to remember a
sequence of pentesting actions. Backpropagation through time
(BPTT) algorithm is used to train the neural network [37].
It is an extension of traditional backpropagation (BP) [38] to
the RNN sequence data. BP propagates the inputs of neural
network to calculate the output, compares it with the predicted
value and adjusts the weights to minimise the prediction error.
The main principle of the autoencoder’s operation is the
adjustment of internal weights within the neural network to
recreate the input as an output with minimal error. This can be
used to reduce the input layer to the smaller hidden layer with
minimal loss. As a result, the autoencoder learns to extract
the correlation of input data automatically and maps it to a
smaller space, increasing performance without sacrificing its
adaptive pentesting capabilities. In the experiments evaluating
AgentPen’s performance, in Section III, features describing
the target host are fed as inputs to the autoencoder. As a
result, the autoencoder maps the features to a smaller hidden
layer, which are then fed as inputs to the approximator-
based Elman-type RNN (Figure 3). These interactions form
the deep learning architecture for AgentPen’s Q-learning
approximation.
In summary, the very nature of reinforcement learning for
our research problem is to learn the optimal sequence of pen-
etration attacks by prioritizing the autonomous AgentPen’s
actions to gain maximum cumulative rewards. The approach
proposed in this paper does so by exploring and exploiting
the target system(s) intelligently to discover vulnerabilities
through interactions with its environment, as opposed to hav-
ing all actions dictated by a pre-generated model. In addition,
unlike supervised learning, AgentPen is not trained with
successful attacks but instead learns from scratch. This is par-
ticularly valuable when the audit tool is capable of discovering
attack sequences without analyst involvement. Therefore, this
reinforcement learning approach offers a critical mechanism
for AgentPen to learn the optimal sequence of system
penetration actions, given metrics of its behaviour, even when
starting from complete ignorance. Alternatively, AgentPen
can be pre-trained before deployment into the environment if
an analyst chooses to. In this case it will be able to identify
the vulnerabilities much faster based on the similarity of
vulnerable configurations it already experienced.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To test AgentPen several experiments were designed to
illustrate how Q-learning could be successfully applied to the
pentesting process and discover its own attack strategy despite
unforeseen environmental changes. Without a pre-defined en-
vironment model AgentPen can only execute actions and
learn from trial/errors it experienced in real-time.
Experiments are divided into two groups, tabular Q-learning
(Figure 4 (a)) and Elman-RNN approximated Q-learning (Fig-
ure 4 (b) and (c)). The first group was intended to test the basic
hypothesis of the model-free approach, as outlined in Section
II and whether it could autonomously learn a technically
correct penetration attack sequence. In these experiments the
Q-learning algorithm (see Algorithm 1) is used without human
assistance or prior knowledge of predefined transitions. The
reward was defined by general reward function. Since these
first experiments were designed to only test the basic concepts,
the penetration testing process was defined as a specific MDP
with state and action spaces.
Once it is established that the tabular setup (first group
of experiments) in Figure 4 (a) could optimally learn a
successful attack strategy, the other two setups (second group
of experiments) were designed to test the performance en-
hancing approximator and AgentPen’s real-time adaptive
capabilities. First group shows the basic model-free approach.
The second group demonstrates the extension of model-free
approach to the real world scenarios when using a state space
reducing autoencoder and aproximator to process large state
spaces. These second group experiments do not compare the
learning speed with the tabular approach, but test the concept
with a larger real-world state space using processes previously
discussed. The second group setups seen in Figure 4 (b) and
(c) use our autoencoder as explained in Section II. With this,
AgentPen not only learns an attack strategy in real time,
but extends that accumulated knowledge to cases it has never
experienced before, like a new target.
The experiments in Group 1 have no state space reduction,
so we used the optimal hyperparameters (e.g., learning rate,
discount factor) of the Q-learning algorithm identified with
our tabular Q-learning experiments. In experiments related to
Fig. 4. Overview of automatic audit experiments.
Group 2, approximator architecture related hyperparameters
were tested in order to check pentesting learning performance:
the autoencoder was tested with different values of weight
decay, number of iterations, neurons per hidden layer, and
sparsity penalties. RNN hyperparameters, such as weight de-
cay, number of iterations and neurons quantity per hidden
layer, were tested as well.
In first setup for Group 2, the successful model-free attacks
were demonstrated in non changing environment. In second
setup for Group 2, the environment was changed during the
audit process. With these changes, the attack strategy that was
learned earlier would no longer lead to successful penetration.
This change is introduced to test if our approach is truly
able to adapt attacks in real-time. In our experiments, it is
shown that AgentPen can do this, independently finding a
new successful penetration attack with its own logic in several
real-world environments.
A. Group 1: Tabular Q-Learning
The first set of experiments to penetrate and escalate privi-
lege in the target consists of learning the optimal audit strategy
using the tabular case Q-learning algorithm (see Figure 4 (a)).
As described in Section II-A, the server executes the majority
of the pentest (i.e. exploit and discovery actions) unless the
client is instructed to perform Exploit3 locally after remote
Exploit2 is executed.
The Group 1 tabular Q-learning experimental results show
that the algorithm was able to learn the most effective sequence
leading to the successful exploitation of the vulnerability after
1,000 episodes: Initialization + OS_Win_Check +
Exploit2 + Exploit3. This solution was the most effective
one for this experiment, as the execution of remote Exploit2
gives AgentPen user privileges, which are then escalated
to admin-level with local Exploit3. This was more effective
than executing the single remote Exploit1 since Exploit2 has
a higher penetration rating that the former and is less harmful
for the system, which affected the reward value. Looking at
these results, it is apparent that Q-learning achieves the best
possible strategy by maximizing the reward.
Fig. 5. Tabular Q-learning experiment performance
Figure 5 shows that the tabular Q-learning algorithm perfor-
mance increased until roughly 545 epochs. This is because the
acting policy initially chooses actions randomly, ignorantly,
but as AgentPen learns, it is able to use past experiences
to optimize exploring target system vulnerabilities. A plateau
appears towards later episodes as AgentPen begins to act
more efficiently. As a result, the best sequence of actions is
always chosen, and the cumulative reward value stabilizes.
In Group 1 experiments the most effective hyper parameters
for the Q-learning algorithm, using the softmax acting policy,
were identified as γ = α = 0.8. The hyper parameter
space was explored experimentally while tuning the machine
learning architecture. Algorithm convergence time was 15-
20 seconds in the tabular case and 1-2 minutes for deep
architecture.
These results show that tabular QL performs relatively well.
Nevertheless, the algorithm performance is hindered by the
random exploring actions at the start. Group 2 experiments
reduce the state space to optimize AgentPen. While it is pos-
sible that “fewer experienced states” could hinder the learning
process, that has not been observed in our experiments.
B. Group 2: RNN Approximated Q-Learning
Group 2 experiments were designed to build on the success
of Group 1 model-free learning approach and address potential
performance issues.Unlike Group 1, Group 2 presents the
attacker host with multiple targets. Target1 is the first target to
be penetrated. During this process AgentPen learns an attack
strategy based on the learning feedback. Once a wealth of
experience is gained, AgentPen is self-directed to penetrate
Target2 using only the knowledge it had accumulated.
In these experiments AgentPen derives the reward value
directly from the environmental feedback while acting without
a predefined transition function. The representation of the
penetration testing process is also generalized for huge state
spaces. This means that, instead of a fixed number of states,
their general representation is defined by the feature set, which
is related to the configuration definition of target system. This
“configuration” is the combination of processes running and
dlls used by the target. The learning performance of feature
extraction, to support the state space reducing autoencoder
architecture, is presented in Figure 6. It should be noted
that the decoder error for the autoencoder learning process
seen here was minimized relatively quickly to 126 after 100
episodes, demonstrating a successful mapping of features to a
Fig. 6. Autoencoder learning process after 100 episodes/iterations
smaller dataset with minimal error. Further minimization of the
error did not improve the following RNN learning processes,
but significantly slowed down the system performance overall.
Therefore, it was decided to use 100 learning epochs as the
most optimal value for AgentPen. After the feature set was
decreased, features were fed to the RNN approximator to learn
a sequence of pentesting actions, as seen in Figure 7.
As the autoencoder learning process is a one-time perfor-
mance cost per target (features are extracted once per host),
it can help reduce overall overheads as AgentPen learns
to penetrate multiple targets, even with some configuration
changes. As a result of Group 2 first setup Figure 4 (b), the
cumulative reward converged to a solution. This showed an
optimal attack strategy, found during the learning process,
and consisted of the following actions: Initialization
+ Probe action (check OS) + Exploit1. This gen-
erates a new, bespoke, attack sequence when targeting a
host it has not experienced before. After the new penetration
sequence is learned, AgentPen self-directs to attack another
target on the network with a client installed. AgentPen then
acts according to its own experiences, gathered during the
learning stage, after it extracts the feature set representing the
new target host configuration. This feature set is, again, used
as an input to the approximator in order to get the sequence of
actions leading to successful penetration without starting the
learning process all over again.
In Group 2 second setup Figure 4 (c), a second solu-
tion was found when Target2 changed its configuration:
Initialize + Exploit1. While this sequence leads to a
successful penetration, it might seem less optimal than the
one first discovered in first setup Figure 4 (b) as probe actions
to check OS were not used. However, it was still effective
in getting admin privileges on the remote host. Given these
results, we can see that the AgentPen was able to penetrate
a new host, with which it had never interacted before. More
importantly, it was able to use past experience accumulated
during the previous learning iterations to adapt its attack the
new Target2 host.
After one successful penetration of a Target2, the tar-
get configuration was changed mid-attack to test whether
AgentPen could truly independently adapt and create an-
other successful penetration strategy (Figure 4 (c)). The old
configuration was updated in such a way that the old suc-
cessful attack strategy, revealed during the second phase, no
longer provided a successful target penetration. As a result, it
Fig. 7. RNN approximated Q-Learning performance
Fig. 8. Adapting RNN approximated QL performance using softmax policy
utilized its learning process (Figure 8) in order to find this
new successful attack strategy: Initialize + Exploit2
+ Exploit3. Therefore, AgentPen did independently adapt
its penetration strategy with minimal overheads.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
The main contribution of the paper is its approach to
automating the computer security audit process using Q-
learning to create an intelligent audit agent. In most other
methods, the attack strategy is developed manually by a
computer security expert. Such approaches cannot handle huge
state spaces or difficult environmental models used during
assessment [39], [40]. In some circumstances, security experts
use semi-automatic tools to support manually created attack
strategies, however more intelligent tools are needed as tech-
nology becomes more prevalent, and the skill gap increases.
Other approaches apply machine learning with environmen-
tal models [41]. Unfortunately, by automating the decision-
making process this way, the planning approach generates
problems. Building models cost time and computations, par-
ticularity when using exhaustive approaches. In cases where
the model was not developed properly, the attack strategy of
the audit agent is not reactive and every change to the host
demands new additional simulations in order to rebuild the
environment model. Additionally, modern penetration testing
systems are not able to accumulate experience in real time.
This paper aims to provide scalable, autonomous, audit-
ing without these drawbacks and the results in Section III
demonstrate that it is possible by applying model-free ma-
chine learning algorithms and state space reductions. In our
approach, people have been fully excluded from the attack
decision-making process, and can instead focus on higher-level
strategies, ethics, etc [42]. The method presented achieved this
despite the fact that multiple steps were needed for a success-
ful attack and the environment could change unexpectedly.
Therefore AgentPen is able to derive attack strategies itself
without cyber security officer involvement. It also learns the
penetration strategy in real-time with accumulated experience.
AgentPen also mitigates the problem of huge state space that
other exhaustive approaches depend on - it uses approximators
to efficiently define all possible host configurations. This
allows for derivation of successful attacks strategies even for
new targets. The developed deep learning architecture works
universally for any quantity and quality of the chosen feature
set. Thus, AgentPen is significantly scalable and adjustable.
There are several future research directions for this work.
Different ways of feature representation could be developed
for optimization. Additional features can be added to the set,
describing a host’s network position in relation to the attack
path. This could make the agent learn attack strategies based
on the target’s network environment as well. The proposed
deep learning architecture leaves freedom to experiment with
different feature extraction and learning mechanisms. For
example, instead of RNNs, different types of neural networks
can be used. The back-propagation algorithm can also be
substituted, or the activation functions, to improve learning
performance. The reward function can also be altered for
different situations, for example factoring in ethics and laws.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A major challenge in modern computer security is automat-
ing audit processes so analysts can reliably, and efficiently,
analyse the growing number of cyber-threats. While most
existing audit tools rely on a predefined attack strategy, require
an environment model of the target, and depend heavily on hu-
man expertise to use the various tools correctly, our proposed
approach has none of these constraints and has been shown
to be a successful, adaptive and learning audit tool. Unlike
previous tools, it can therefore make autonomous decisions
on which attack strategy to implement, even when facing
unforeseen changes. As AgentPen accumulates knowledge,
it is able to learn new optimal attack sequences, explore new
host environments, and improve its own internal penetration
testing logic. With the positive experimental results, we be-
lieve that the model-free Q-based learning approach proposed,
enhanced with an approximator, can inform analysts of the
events leading to security breaches, highlighting potential
vulnerabilities, and reducing the amount of menial tasks a
typical penetration tester would need to do for the same result.
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